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AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By Lucas 
A. Powe, Jr. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1987. Pp. x, 
295. $25. 
Prior to American Broadcasting and the First Amendment, no legal 
writer had "explored the question of abuses in broadcasting regula-
tion,'' according to the book's author, Lucas Powe. 1 Powe attempts to 
fill this void with a conversational, anecdotal account of broadcast reg-
ulation calculated to appeal to the broadcast student or dilettante, as 
well as the legal scholar. In addition to recounting the history of 
broadcast regulation, American Broadcasting advocates nonregulation 
of both the broadcast and print media. This position challenges the 
popular theory of partial regulation of the mass media promulgated by 
Dean Lee Bollinger. 2 According to Bollinger, maintaining a regulated 
broadcast media in addition to a nonregulated print media provides 
the best of all worlds: the regulated broadcast media equalizes com-
muI).icators' disparate access to media resources, while the nonregu-
lated print media preserves "free speech" as it is traditionally known. 3 
While Powe's expose of broadcast regulation abuse is intended to in-
validate Bollinger's theory, his book illustrates the difficulty of re-
sponding to a major first amendment theory in a book intended to be 
"fun" and "easy" to read (p. ix). 
Powe presents his analysis of broadcast regulation in four sections, 
beginning with the history of broadcast regulation and progressing to 
his conclusion that deregulation of the broadcast media is warranted 
and necessary. In his first section, "The Setting" (pp. 11-45), Powe 
describes the origin of the judicially created dichotomy between the 
broadcast media and the print media and the government's use of this 
distinction to justify infringement of broadcasters' free speech rights. 
In NBC v. United States, 4 the Supreme Court fourid that, while the 
broadcast media was protected under the first amendment, broadcast 
spectrum scarcity necessitated government intervention. 5 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) requirements that local broadcasting affiliates be 'free to select 
programming without constraints from the commercial broadcasting 
1. P. 6. Lucas A. Powe, Jr. is Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor at the University of 
Texas Law School. Powe's works include Consistency Over Tim'e: The FCC's Indecency Rerun, 
10 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 571 (1988); Tomi/lo, 1987 SUP. Cr. REV. 345; Economic Make-
Believe in the Supreme Court, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 385 (1986). 
2. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regula-
tion of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976). 
3. Id. at 27, 33. 
4. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
5. 319 U.S. at 226-27. 
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networks did not violate broadcasters' free speech rights. 6 
The Court again emphasized the scarcity-based distinction be-
tween the broadcast media and the print media in two later cases, Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC1 and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo. 8 In Tornillo, the Supreme Court struck down a statute re-
quiring newspapers to print the replies of political candidates criti-
cized by the newspaper. Although the Court had previously upheld 
application of a similar regulation to broadcasting in Red Lion, the 
Tornillo Court held that such a requirement violated the first amend-
ment when applied to the print media. The disparity between the two 
results implicitly perpetuated the dichotomy between the broadcast 
media and the print media. 9 
Powe illustrates his thesis that broadcast regulation is simply a 
misnomer for government censorship by describing the FCC's use of 
its scarcity-derived power to silence early broadcast personalities such 
as "Fighting Bob" Shuler. 10 The Reverend Bob Shuler was a prohibi-
tionist and moralist who used his local radio show to accuse Los An-
geles officials of corruption. Because both the FCC and the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that Shuler's show "exceeded all 
bounds of propriety," Shuler's broadcast license was not renewed (p. 
18). According to Powe, the court overlooked the possibility that 
Shuler's allegations were correct (p. 18). Thus, Shuler was silenced for 
challenging the establishment - a media role which traditionally re-
ceived broad first amendment protection. 11 
6. Powe describes this decision as a syllogism that followed from the assumption of scarcity: 
Because the scarcity of frequencies requires the government to allocate rights to broadcast, 
some mechanism of allocation was necessary. In selecting the public interest, convenience, 
or necessity as the mechanism, Congress did not violate the First Amendment. Thus, all 
First Amendment rights are intact - but significantly, these rights do not include use of 
radio without a government license. 
P. 37. 
7. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
8. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
9. The absence of any reference to Red Lion in Tomi/lo supports this contention. See Bollin· 
ger, supra note 2, at 4-6. 
10. Pp. 13-18. The case involved was Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio 
Commn., 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932). 
11. Powe further dramatizes his point by describing the government-induced demise of Dr. 
"Goat Gland" Brinkley's medical advice radio show. Dr. Brinkley achieved fame for his "goat 
gonad" operations to increase male virility, and gave medical advice complete with prescriptions 
of his own line of pharmaceuticals. Pp. 24-26. Brinkley achieved wide popularity; his Milford, 
Kansas radio station was among the most popular in the nation, and Brinkley might have won 
the Kansas gubernatorial race as a write-in candidate had officials not thrown out some of his 
votes. Pp. 23, 26. Not surprisingly, Brinkley incurred the enmity of organized medical practi· 
tioners and was attacked by both the Kansas Board of Medical Examiners and the Federal Radio 
Commission (a precursor to the Federal Communications Commission) at the peak of his radio 
career. P. 26. On the premise that radio is regulable as an entertainment medium, the FRC 
declined to renew Brinkley's license because his programming was "insufficiently attuned to the 
needs of Kansas." Pp 26-27. Although Brinkley's focus on the prostate, rather than the polit· 
ical, makes his case less compelling than Shuler's, it similarly supports Powe's assertion that 
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In the second section, "Licensing" (pp. 49-101 ), Powe describes 
how broadcast licensing evolved from a mechanism to prevent signal 
interference to a governmental conscription device to secure "public 
service" from broadcasters (p. 61). Powe emphasizes the potential for 
abuse inherent in the licensing system, describing the license award 
process under Presidents Roosevelt and Eisenhower as "Giving Away 
the Pot of Gold" (chapter 5). For example, Roosevelt attempted to 
retaliate against his newspaper critics by blocking newspaper owner-
ship of broadcast stations.12 in addition, license awards to members of 
the President's political party were the most common form of license 
abuse. Powe describes the award of a lucrative Austin, Texas VHF 
television license to Claudia Taylor Johnson - wife of future presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson -in 1952 (p. 79). Surprisingly, Ms. Johnson's 
application for the valuable VHF license was uncontested, while less 
desirable UHF licenses were highly sought. Apparently, potential ap-
plicants for the VHF license had been deterred by the political influ-
ence of the Johnson family. Thus, according to Powe, "[p]olitics is 
politics,"13 even when free speech concerns are involved. 
Powe found that the license renewal process further enhances the 
FCC's ability to use license awards to favor political party members. 
While the FCC cannot dictate a broadcaster's speech, it may refuse to 
renew the license of a broadcaster with whom it disagrees. Although 
Powe concedes the FCC has not always used its power to refuse to 
renew a license (p. 86), he asserts that the danger lies not in actual 
nonrenewal, but rather in the FCC's ability to threaten nonrenewal (p. 
101). Licensed stations may become willing to further the political 
agenda of the party in power when their investment in a licensed sta-
tion is threatened. Thus, Powe argues, any licensing system accords 
the federal government the power not only to award licenses based 
upon party preferences, but to coerce license-holders by threatening 
nonrenewal (pp. 100-01). 
Powe's third section, "Supervision" (pp. 105-90), describes addi-
tional government attempts to use its coercive licensing power to 
achieve political goals and silence dissent. For example, the Demo-
cratic National Committee (DNC) attempted to use the fairness doc-
trine to counteract the radical right during the Kennedy 
administration (p. 114). Although the doctrine was intended to in-
broadcast regulation results in government censorship. See KFKB Broadcasting Assn. v. Fed-
eral Radio Commn., 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). 
12. P. 70. Powe illustrates FDR's determination by quoting a one-sentence memorandum 
FDR sent to FCC chairperson James Fly: "Will you let me know when you propose to have a 
hearing on newspaper ownership of radio stations[?]" P. 72 (citing E. BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN 
WEB 170 (1968)). 
13. P. 80 (citing How President's Wife Built $17,500 into -Big Fortune in Television, Wall St. 
J., Mar. 23, 1964 at 1, 12). 
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crease the breadth of information available for public debate, 14 the 
DNC used it as a tool for silencing speakers who were unwilling to 
provide the forum for the DNC's response. 15 Powe's discussion reca-
pitulates the theme of earlier sections that the government constantly 
manipulates broadcast regulation to achieve political ends. 
Yet Powe's arguments go beyond the political realm to assert that 
the federal government's power over the media also maintains the cul-
tural status quo. Powe details FCC efforts aimed at radio broadcasters 
to squelch language and music which challenge majoritarian cultural 
norms (pp. 162-90). Although the FCC may be reluctant to attempt 
official bans on songs or speech, he argues, it may instead use its coer-
cive power under the licensing system to encourage self-censorship 
among broadcasters, 16 leading those broadcasters to promulgate 
majoritarian communications at the cost of diversity (p. 176). Powe's 
primary concern, however, stems from his distrust of governmental 
decisionmakers: He identifies misguided FCC efforts to discourage air 
play of such songs as the anti-drug "Acid Queen" by The Who (p. 
177) and the innocent "Puff the Magic Dragon" (p. 180) to show that 
the government censors not only what it dislikes, but what it doesn't 
understand. 
In his final section, "The Present and the Future" (pp. 193-247), 
Powe analyzes the rationales for broadcast regulation, focusing partic-
ularly on the scarcity rationale relied on in NBC and Red Lion. Powe 
suggests that broadcasting suffers not from a scarcity problem, but 
rather from the "lack of a property mechanism to allocate the right to 
broadcast" (p. 201). According to Powe, the "private market in 
broadcast licenses [which] now flourishes," with transactions subject 
to only pro forma FCC approval (p. 201), provides evidence that 
broadcast regulation is simply a matter of economic allocation. The 
federal government awards VHF television licenses at no cost to licen-
sees - who immediately resell at profit. Were the frequencies allo-
14. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (footnote omitted): 
Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment goal of producing an 
informed public capable of conducting its own affairs to require a broadcaster to permit 
answers to personal attacks occurring in the course of discussing controversial issues, or to 
require that the political opponents of those endorsed by the station be given a chance to 
communicate with the public. Otherwise, station owners and a few networks would have 
unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only 
their views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with 
whom they agreed. 
15. Pp. 114-15. Powe gives additional evidence of the silencing effect of the fairness doctrine 
by citing the reluctance of Boston radio stations to report on partisan politics following its articu-
lation in Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 {1941). In Mayflower, the FCC found 
a licensee had failed to fulfill its "obligation of presenting all sides of important public questions, 
fairly, objectively and without bias," and renewed its application only upon a showing that the 
station had ceased editorializing. 8 F.C.C. at 340-41. 
16. Powe describes it as "a neat trick. Drug lyrics were not banned, but should a station play 
such songs, it could lose its license. That, of course, has been the charm of licensing from its 
inception." P. 181. 
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cated at market cost, "excess demand [would] vanish[]" (p. 203) and 
there would be no need for a Federal Communications Commission 
(p. 201). 
In a coda to this broadcast regulation analysis, Powe explores the 
regulatory response to cable networks. Powe asserts that the courts' 
rationales for broadcast regulation are inapplicable to cable because 
cable does not suffer from any spectrum scarcity.17 While first amend-
ment protection of cable has evolved to. a level comparable to that of 
the print media, 18 Powe poses the FCC's initial reaction to cable as 
the paradigm FCC response to new technology: regulate it, Powe 
suggests that this is a typical governmental response to technological 
innovation in communications. For example, printing presses were 
regulated upon their introduction in England. "The rulers didn't 
know what to make of this new technology, and the easiest way to 
make sure it did not get out of hand was to keep it under royal scru-
tiny" (p. 214). Powe cites the Americanjudiciary's similar response to 
motion pictures (pp. 27-28), broadcasting (p. 12), and more recently, 
cable (pp. 220-21). Powe ominously warns· that, "as newer technolo-
gies become available to the public there will be an intense desire to 
keep them under control" (p. 215). Accordingly, Powe suggests that 
all new technologies should be greeted with a presumption of 
nonregulation.19 · 
Powe's book thus provides the uninitiated with a guided tour 
through the world of broadcast regulation. On your right is the FCC, 
on your left are the broadcasters it silences, including not only the 
colorful figure of Reverend Shuler, but all-time favorites such as Puff, 
the Magic Dragon. Because the book is calculated to reach an audi-
ence unfamiliar with the legal theories, Powe finds it unnecessary to 
explore free speech theory beyond a general preference for a laissez-
faire marketplace model. Powe's failure to examine adequately other 
theories of "free speech" is unfortunate. The lay reader encountering 
broadcast regulation for the first time receives only cursory exposure 
to the major first amendment theories which form the premise of 
broadcast regulation. Similarly, the legal reader will find the superfi-
cial analysis inadequate to support Powe's preference of nonregulation 
over Bollinger's partial regulation scheme. 
17. P. 217. This point appears superflous, considering Powe's rejection of these rationales in 
the previous chapter, "The Modem Rationale for Broadcast Regulation" (pp. 197-215). 
18. The FCC realized soon after the introduction of cable technology that its regulation 
could not be premised on broadcast regulation rationales, but continued to regulate cable in a 
politically compelled effort to protect broadcasters from cable competition. Pp. 219-20. Eventu-
ally, in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit held that the absence of spectrum scarcity required that cable receive the same first 
amendment protections as the print media. 567 F.2d at 44-51. This position has yet to gain 
Supreme Court approval. 
19. See pp. 254-56. 
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In contrast to Powe's laissez-faire approach, Bollinger's thesis rests 
on "public access theory."20 Under this doctrine, the "uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open" public debate envisioned by the Supreme 
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 21 cannot take place when the 
most pervasive communications media are controlled by a small group 
of private parties concerned only with maximizing profits.22 Because 
profits depend upon audience size, these owners promulgate main-
stream perspectives designed to appeal to the maximum number of 
readers, viewers, or listeners, while unorthodox or unpopular views 
are unable to gain access to comparable forums. 23 
To Bollinger, a completely unregulated media - both broadcast 
and print - would perpetuate these marketplace inequities. While 
government regulation of both media might correct these inequities, it 
might endanger other first amendment values by chilling speech, risk-
ing government abuse, and increasing the amount of speech regula-
tion.24 In contrast, regulation of the broadcast media and 
nonregulation of the print media creates a "beneficial tension" that 
minimizes the costs associated with each of these approaches.25 While 
Bollinger agrees with Powe that the distinction between the broadcast 
media and the print media is ill-founded,26 he asserts that the distinc-
tion has yielded a desirable result. 
Powe rejects Bollinger's thesis on the ground that the FCC's abuse 
of its licensing power renders regulation of the broadcast media unde-
sirable. Powe focuses on Bollinger's assertion that there has been an 
"absence of egregious abuses of power by the FCC. "27 Powe dis-
agrees; he believes the FCC frequently and egregiously abuses its regu-
latory power. 
However, Powe's attempt to refute Bollinger does not specifically 
address Bollinger's arguments. For example, Powe describes the 
Nixon Administration's attempt to silence its critics among the press 
20. The leading authority for this theory is Barron, Access to the Press - A New First 
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1641 (1967). 
21. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
22. Because this theory assumes a scarce medium imposed by sociological and economic 
factors, rather than the physical scarcity of broadcast frequencies relied on in Red Lion and 
NBC, it applies to natural monopoly newspapers as well as to the broadcast media. See Barron, 
supra note 20, at 164347; see also Jacklin, Especially Protected Speech: Rights of Access to the 
Media, in FREE BUT REGULATED 248, 250 (D. Brenner & w. Rivers eds. 1982). 
23. See W. VAN AISTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 88-90 (1984); 
Barron, supra note 20, at 1647. 
24. See Bollinger, supra note 2, at 27-33. 
25. Id. at 33. 
26. See id. at 8-16. Like Powe, Bollinger focuses extensively on the scarcity rationale relied 
on in NBC and Red Lion. "The scarcity rational does not •.• explain why what appears to be a 
similar phenomenon of natural monopolization within the newspaper industry does not consti-
tute an equally appropriate occasion for access regulation." Id. at 10. 
27. Id. at 33. 
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by using the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, and the FCC "to intimidate a news medium 
which depends for its existence upon government licenses."28 Powe 
uses Nixon's efforts to illustrate the federal government's ability to 
control any medium which depends upon the federal government for 
its existence. 
Bollinger, on the other hand, used the Nixon attack to illustrate his 
assertion that the nonregulated print media functions as a check upon 
the regulated broadcast media. 29 While "broadcasters may initially 
have been reluctant to cover Watergate events because of fears of offi-
cial reprisals and access obligations," Bollinger stated, "a decision not 
to cover the story would have been impossible once the print media 
began exploiting it."30 
Still, Powe asserts that broadcast regulation poses a greater threat 
to free speech than Bollinger anticipated. Although the FCC is per-
mitted to regulate only the broadcast media, it .may influence print 
media establishments which own broadcast affiliates. For example, 
the Nixon administration attacked the Washington Post indirectly by 
challenging its broadcast holdings (pp. 121, 131-32). Powe appears to 
be arguing that the FCC can achieve a degree of indirect control upon 
the print media which Bollinger did not anticipate. 
However, Powe ignores the benefit side of Bollinger's partial regu-
lation equation.· Bollinger's theory does not nece_ssarily fail upon a 
showing that the traditional free speech costs of partial regulation are 
high. Rather, such costs must outweigh the potential free speech ben-
efits of correcting the access inequities which precede government reg-
ulation. For example, Powe might argue that such inequities do not 
exist and therefore require no corrective regulation. Powe might also 
argue the regulations do not and cannot correct marketplace errors, 31 
or that federal regulation threatens the marketplace-of-ideas to the de-
gree that the value of correcting its inequities is negligible. However, 
Powe's anecdotal presentation precludes the systemic balancing neces-
sary to support such assertions.32 
28. Pp. 124-25 (citing R. NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 412 (1978)). Accord-
ing to Powe, this "titanic test of strength" between the President and the broadcast media was 
ended only by the advent of Watergate. P. 132. 
29. Bollinger, supra note 2, at 32-33. 
30. Id. at 33. 
31. See, e.g., former FCC Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson's assertion that the FCC's nota-
ble lack of success in achieving diversity and responsiveness fo community needs through broad-
cast regulations, in addition to the "serious constitutional issues raised by such an activity," 
constitute strong reasons to doubt the wisdom of broadcast regulation. Robinson, The Federal 
Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 261 
(1978). 
32. Cf., e.g., Alderson, Everyman TV, in FREE BUT REGULATED 255, 256-57 (D. Brenner & 
W. Rivers eds. 1982) (access requirements imposed upon cable franchises have resulted in discus-
sion of ideas ranging from astrology to feminism and parapsychology that are unable to gain 
access to network channels, as well as more programs featuring women, blacks, Hispanics, and 
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While Powe's mistrust of the government motivates his deregula-
tion advocacy, his failure to respond to public access theory denies 
him the opportunity to argue why market allocation is preferable. For 
example, Powe agrees with Bollinger that television broadcasters func-
tion within economic constraints that impose a censorship function 
similar to that of the government. 33 However, were Powe's deregula-
tion model adopted, such majoritarian censorship would likely per-
vade all profit-motivated communication media. 34 It remains unclear 
why majoritarian domination of communication channels is preferable 
if imposed by the marketplace rather than by the government. 
Powe's failure to respond fully to Bollinger's theory of partial regu-
lation may have frustrated both of his goals in writing American 
Broadcasting and the First Amendment. Although his stories may be 
"fun" and "easy" to read, Powe's one-sided presentation of the broad-
cast regulation debate risks misleading the lay reader toward whom he 
targeted his book (p. 1). After reading the parade of horribles Powe 
presents as representative of broadcast regulation, uninitiated readers 
will wonder at the j"\ldiciary's idiocy in allowing any form of broadcast 
regulation. 
Despite his articulated goal of refuting Bollinger's partial regula-
tion theory, Powe apparently believes his targeted audience is unable 
to digest the finer points of Bollinger's arguments. Thus, he presents 
only half of the equation - the costs half - without account for po-
tential benefitS access regulation may create. Because Powe has 
proficiently analyzed public access theory in other settings, 35 this 
shortcoming is unfortunate for American Broadcasting readers. 
Powe hopes, at a minimum, to shock the "complacency of Bollin-
ger's followers" (p. 248). Even if the harms of governmental abuse do 
not outweigh the benefits of access regulation, such abuses still injure 
the values and goals that regulation seeks to achieve. Powe's identifi-
members of other minorities than are available on major networks); Weissman, The FCC and 
Minorities: an Evaluation of 'FCC Policies Designed to Encourage Programming Responsive to 
Minority Needs, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 561 (1981) (the FCC has the capability to imple-
ment minority representation in radio programming, but presently does not due to an inadequate 
regulatory scheme); Wimmer, Deregulaiion and the Market Failure in Minority Programming: 
The Socioeconomic Dimensions of Broadcast Reform, 8 HASflNGS COMM/ENT L.J. 329 (1986) 
(the deregulation movement has undercut FCC efforts to equalize minority participation in the 
broadcast media). , , 
33. See pp. 163-65 for Powe's discussion of the economic inc~ntives for retaining violence on 
television while censoring sex and immorality. 
34. William Van Alstyne asserts' that, despite abuses of federal regulations, 
it would almost surely be a serious mistake literally to "privatize" the airways completely. 
In a soci~ty where the effective speech-rights of all are already by no means equal (to the 
extent that they obviously depend significantly upon 'one's "speech-property" holdings), it is 
not obVious that the freedom of speech would be appropriately enhanced by exclusive reli· 
ance upon a private property system that would literally drive out all those unable to com· 
pete effectively with dollars. 
W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 23, at 88 (emphasis in original). 
35. See Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. Cr. REV. 243. 
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cation of flagrant broadcast regulation abuse should thus be taken seri-
ously by even the most ardent partial regulation theorist. However, 
shocking Bollinger's followers and converting them are two different 
things. While Powe's litany of abuse may achieve the former goal, his 
arguments fail to compel the latter. 
- Rene L. Todd 
